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ABSTRACT

The Effects of Below-Threshold Color Manipulation on Perceptual DecisionMaking and Confidence Reports
by
Trevor Caruso

Advisors: Tony Ro, Richard Brown

Confidence measures are sometimes used to index awareness below a participant’s criterion for
what counts as being subjectively aware of a stimulus or stimulus property. If confidence ratings
index awareness below subjective thresholds, then one might be tempted to use confidence ratings
in place of subjective reports of whether a stimulus/stimulus property was “seen” or “unseen”. As
such, a dissociation of confidence from performance may be construed as a dissociation of
subjective awareness from objective task performance. This methodology has been used as
supporting evidence for blindsight in typical observers (Balsdon and Azzopardi 2015; Peters and
Lau 2015; Peters et al. 2017; Knotts et al., 2018). To further examine whether confidence can be
used to reliably index a dissociation of awareness from objective performance, we conducted a
web-based experiment using a 2AFC task to evaluate discrimination sensitivity for shape-majority
decisions (a fixed ratio of two groups of shapes) under the independent variable: differentially
colored shape ratios where either shape may be colored differently. Using a near-threshold color
difference, we created conditions to render the color manipulation subjectively unaware. We found
iv

that confidence reports did not co-vary with performance on the primary task for participants who
experienced performance increases with near-threshold color differences. Further research is
necessary to support these findings.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Confidence in our decisions is generally considered to be a metacognitive process.
Assessments of our thoughts, strategies, or cognitive processes may be reflected in degrees of
confidence when an individual evaluates their decisions. However, when making decisions we are
sometimes subjectively conscious of those factors which influence our decisions and sometimes
not. When subjectively conscious, we are able to reflect upon our decisions with different levels of
confidence. Yet, under certain circumstances such as blindsight, knowledge of the evidence which
led to one’s decision may be introspectively inaccessible. By segregating awareness and
performance, some researchers hope to answer how subjective experience may diverge from
behavioral responses. An opportunity to parse a tentatively disparate relationship between how
something is experienced and a reflex-like response, they argue, might grant the occasion to
operationalize certain components of the subjective experience. Therefore, metacognitive measures
such as confidence ratings may elicit something akin to a subjective experience: as one is assessing
via subjective measures, one’s performance. Finding the neuroanatomical correlates of
metacognitive awareness has become a central theme of some researchers seeking to explain
components of subjective experience.

Blindsight
Dissociations between conscious awareness and performance have been observed in
patients with missing or damaged portions of their visual cortices. Researchers have observed that
blindsight patients perform well above chance even as they report no conscious awareness of the
stimulus (Poppel, Held, & Frost, 1973). Although participants report they have no awareness of a
target stimulus, they perform as though they are subjectively aware. This observation has led some
researchers to conclude that subjective awareness (where participants report their awareness of a
1

stimulus) and objective performance are dissociable. In an attempt to mitigate response bias,
subjective measures have sometimes been used in place of participant report for observations that
lie below a subject’s subjective threshold (Merikle,1984; Cheesman and Merikle, 1986; Norman
and Price, 2015). One might be tempted to conclude that if confidence is in some way indexing
subjective awareness in a more ‘refined' way, then one could reliably use confidence measures to
indicate awareness. If a participant is unable to report awareness of target stimulus features that lie
below their subjective threshold, are confidence ratings able to reliably index those features?

Relative blindsight
In contrast with instances of absolute blindsight observed in these patients, it has
remained controversial as to whether a dissociation between confidence and performance can be
measured in typical populations. Attempts have been made to separate the two measures in normal
populations by inducing ‘relative blindsight’, whereby researchers create performance-matched
conditions yet subjective consciousness is variable (Lau & Passingham, 2006). Some critics
(including Lau) have objected, arguing that evidence supporting the relative blindsight paradigm
may be contaminated by response bias confounds (Balsdon & Azzzopardi, 2014; Peters and Lau
2015; Peters, Kentridge, Phillips, & Block, 2017; Knotts, Lau Peters, 2018; Rajananda, Zhu, &
Peters, 2020). Importantly, the use of confidence in lieu of subjective report in some studies may be
confounded by unknown factors which drive confidence reports. One heuristic model of confidence
reports proposes that confidence ratings may be a response variable constituted of evidence that is
congruent with one’s response (Maniscalco, Peters, & Lau, 2016).
This has led some researchers to categorize any degree of confidence regarding a
metacognitive assessment of a stimulus/stimulus property as indicating subjectively conscious
awareness: either negating subjective conscious report entirely (viewing it as unreliable) and/or
2

adopting a graded scale of how conscious a stimulus was to an observer. Consistent with this line
of reasoning, perhaps participants are (or were) consciously aware, yet they are unable to
cognitively access those internal states or representations for report (Block, 2007). Others count
only those trials where participants are able to report their awareness of the stimulus or stimulus
property as being subjectively conscious, reserving unreportable awareness as a separate
categorical mechanism of cognitive function (Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006). This is more than a
semantic argument as confidence and decision-making performance may rely on separate neural
mechanisms or computational means: confidence being a heuristic probability, using priors from
response-congruent evidence and decision making using all task-relevant evidence available
(Maniscalco, Peters, Lau, 2016).
In some instances, researchers determined to use observations that lie below subjective
thresholds (regardless of a participant’s reports of ‘unseen’, or unaware) have turned to confidence
measures as being a more robust measure of subjective consciousness (Merikle, 1984; Cheesman
and Merikle, 1986; Norman and Price, 2015). Those who advocate for objective thresholds as a
measure of conscious perception (instead of self-report) prescribe above chance performance to
classify awareness of stimuli as being conscious. In contrast, others conclude that if blindsight
patients are unable to evaluate their performance with any degree of confidence, yet performance is
better than chance, then there are instances where a subject may be subjectively unaware but
objectively aware.
For typical observers, confidence generally covaries with performance; participants are
more confident as their performance increases. This colinearity persists with increases or decreases
in the amount of evidence presented in either a detection or discrimination task, or changes in the
stimulus energy. Even though blindsight cases may provide evidence that a participant’s
3

performance on a task does not necessarily track confidence, evidence for this dissociation in
typical observers is mostly limited to TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) induced blindsight
(Ro, Shelton, Lee Chang, 2004; Ro, Rahal, 2006; Rahnev, Maniscalco, Luber, Lau, Lisanby, 2012;
Allen, Sumner, Chambers, 2014). Behavioral paradigms, such as attempts to induce “featural
blindsight” (facial feature discrimination without introspective access to the evidence which led to
one’s decision), have fallen short of a true dissociation; yielding results that are confounded by
response bias (Rajananda, Zhu, Peters, 2020). In general, if I am able to perform well at a task, I
am more confident in my decisions and if I perform poorly then my confidence generally reflects
that.
In the present study, participants were tasked with deciding which of two shape
orientations there were more of. We used stimulus properties (near-threshold color differences)
which were not task-relevant in order to dissociate shape-task performance from confidence and
awareness under different color conditions. This enabled the observation of those task-relevant
measures of interest under conditions that were manipulated without a participant’s awareness of
the manipulated stimulus properties. We hypothesized that shape performance, awareness, and
confidence are dissociable between control and experimental conditions. Discrepancies between
one’s performance and confidence in their decisions may indicate separate neural mechanisms as
evidenced in blindsight patients. By introducing near-threshold color differences to either the
majority or minority shape groups, we intend to dissociate performance from participant's
confidence in their decisions. The present paradigm may offer a way to examine the neural
correlates of this dissociation in feature-discrimination tasks. Although feature discrimination may
be qualitatively different than detection, the present study supports that unconscious stimulus
changes can influence performance without confidence or awareness indexing those changes.
4

These findings highlight some of the complications in using decision confidence as an analogous,
refined, measure of awareness in feature discrimination tasks.

5

CHAPTER 2: METHODS
Participants
The experiment was created with Psychopy® and hosted online using the web-based
platform: Pavlovia®. Participants (N > 30; Male or Female ≥ 18 years of age) were selected
randomly from a world-wide pool of prescreened samples. 24 females and 19 males (N = 43) were
recruited via Prolific®, a crowd-sourcing platform for large-scale data collection
(www.prolific.com) [March 14, 2022]. Participants ages 19-64 years old took part. All of the
participants experienced the same test; only the presentation order of the stimulus images was
randomized. Each participant agreed to participate in the study with informed consent.
The initial setup consisted of 30-item stimuli presentations at a 1:2 ratio. The results
suggested that the task was too difficult for participants. The final version of the study used the
same 1:2 ratio, but with 24 stimulus items (8 of one shape species and 16 of the other) on every
trial. Only the number of stimulus items differed; all other variables remained the same.
Exclusion criteria: Each participant responded “yes” to having normal or corrected-tonormal vision. Participants with Prolific® (a web-based data collection site) accounts were
prescreened by ‘approval ratings’ (with a minimum Approval Rate of 100%.1) and color blindness.
.
Visual Displays, Setup, and Monitor Calibration
Participants were instructed to disable any display filters (such as those that adjust a
display’s color temperature). Screen size differences were controlled for each participants’ monitor
via the use of a scaling procedure using a standard credit card. This allowed the image size of the
stimuli to remain consistent across participants. Each participant was instructed to remain 57cm or
1

Prolific® members may receive a ‘rejection’ status for any data submission. Instances of ‘rejection’ are tracked by
Prolific® and participants can be filtered by the experimenter according to the rate of those rejections.
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“approximately arm’s length” from their monitor.
The current study was developed using Psychopy® (Peirce et al., 2007): an open-source,
Python-based software package with JavaScript outputs for online studies. The experiment was
hosted online using the web-based platform, Pavlovia® and will recruit participants through
Prolific®.

Stimulus
Groups of stimulus items were presented within a visual angle of approximately 8° (the
paracentral range). There exists some slight variation in visual angle between trials due to the
randomization properties of the ‘repel function’2 for the stimulus items which were drawn at
random.
For each participant, there were 2 levels of color which progress with respect to hue
level: light-green and contrasting green. The contrasting color consisted of one of 5 preselected
colors, chosen to be difficult to discriminate as determined by a series of preliminary
discrimination decisions (see Stimulus Selection Procedure). Stimulus items were presented with
the same 2:1 ratio (either ‘x’ shapes or ‘plus’ shapes) for every trial. Each shape type is identical
with respect to shape and area, and only differ in its degree (45°) of rotation. The total number of
stimulus items presented on a given trial was 30.

Conditions
To investigate whether the dependent variables (confidence and performance) dissociate,
we presented participants with either of 2 conditions in each trial: (1) a monochromatic condition
2 ‘Repel’ is an R (programming language) function that limits the proximity of data-points. In this case, the
individual stimulus items.
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(MC) where all stimulus items are colored using the same hue value (all light or all dark). (2) a
contrast condition (CC) where all of either stimulus item types (‘x’-shapes or ‘plus’-shapes) are
either one hue or the other. The independent variable, the colored shape group, was implemented to
make the task easier for participants to estimate which stimulus type there was more of in a given
trial.

Stimulus Selection Procedure
There are 5 levels of CC of which a single level was administered to each participant
according to their ability to correctly discriminate a difference between those trials with
monochromatic stimuli items and differentially colored stimulus items. Participants were asked to
detect color differences in presented stimulus items with the same stimulus duration as the
experimental procedure (200 ms). Failure to sufficiently discriminate contrast trials from
monochromatic trials within the respective trial block advanced the participant to the successive
level until they were able to discriminate differentially colored stimuli from monochromatic stimuli
with ≥ 75% accuracy (18/24 correct), or reach the maximum contrast value level of the CC
stimuli.3 Upon reaching the successful discrimination criterion (or reaching the maximum contrast
value level), the routine shall branch to trial blocks with those CC values matching the respective
level of successful discrimination. Hue difference levels progressed beginning with the closest
match corresponding to the most similar of green values on an RGB scale.
Importantly, we are interested in the relative difference between the trials with
monochromatic stimuli and those CC trials with differentially colored stimuli. Rather than
staircasing, two similar colors were preselected to render ~50% of the trials in the CC condition as
3 This procedure is intended to elicit data where ~50% of the CC trials will be classified as seen.
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unaware.

Trial Procedure
After the stimulus selection procedure, 120 monochromatic trials and 240 trials with the
corresponding color levels were shuffled at random. Experimental trials were presented to the
participant with a fixation point (black disc) in the center of the target field for a period of 750 ms.
Each target stimulus was presented for a 200 ms duration. Immediately following the target stimuli,
a 500 ms mask was presented. The mask consisted of a mosaic of an equal number of each shapekinds with each of the color values used in the contrast conditions (See Figure 1). The order of the
questions regarding shape and color were reversed in the second trial block. After each stimulus
presentation, participants were asked a series of questions regarding the stimulus and their
decision:

(1) Which were there more of?

Forced choices
 ‘X’-shapes
 ‘Plus’-shapes
(2) Please rate how confident you are that your answer is correct.

Scale
1 = No confidence (I have no idea which shape there were more of)
2 = Somewhat confident
3 = More confident
4 = Highly confident
(3) Were there any color differences?

Forced choices
 Yes
 No
(4) How confident are you that you noticed/didn't notice a color difference?
9

Scale
1 = No confidence (I have no idea whether some of them were colored differently)
2 = Somewhat confident
3 = More confident
4 = Highly confident

Figure 1: Visual timeline of an example trial. Target stimulus items in the above example are
presented with a 2:1 ratio, ‘Plus’ to ‘X’. 100% of the majority shape-kind is colored darker than
the minority shape. Visual mask consists of all color levels for each shape.
Analyses
To investigate whether shape-majority discrimination performance diverges from a
participant’s choice-confidence under these conditions, multiple analyses were conducted,
comparing: (1) MC, with CC when observers were (2) aware and were (3) unaware of the color
manipulation. The dependent variables of interest primarily include shape decision performance
(percent correct and d’), shape decision confidence (scale 1-4), and awareness of the color
manipulation (yes/no). Confidence ratings for the color awareness decision will also be collected.
1. Percent correct and d' calculations for the shape decision assessed the relationship
10

between monochromatic trials and those threshold trials where participants either were or were not
aware of the color difference. Similarly, percent correct was calculated for color detection for
monochromatic and (all) threshold trials. d' scores for the color detection task was also
calculated.
2. A two-way ANOVA with color condition (mono, aware, unaware) x confidence rating
(1-4) as the two within-subject factors was performed on participant scores to assess the differences
in mean shape discrimination scores (‘which shape were there more of?’) under the MC and CC
conditions when observers were aware and were unaware of the color manipulation.
3. Three separate one-way ANOVAs with three levels (mono, aware, unaware) were
conducted to assess the relationship of color condition on meta-d', meta-difference (meta-d' - d'),
and meta-ratio (meta-d' / d') shape scores. Similarly, three separate one-way ANOVAs with two
levels (mono and threshold color difference) were conducted to assess the relationship of color
condition on meta-d', meta-difference (meta-d' - d'), and meta-ratio (meta-d' / d') color scores.
4. To assess the relationship between confidence (meta-d') and performance (d') measures
of the shape decision, 3 regression analyses were conducted for each color level (mono and
threshold [aware & unaware]). Similarly, to assess the relationship between confidence (meta-d')
and performance (d') measures of the color decision, a regression analysis was conducted.
Because web-based experiments limit monitoring by the experimenter, stringent
exclusion criteria was used. Participant data where response redundancy for trial blocks exceeds
any series of 20 of the same response type were determined as ‘low-effort’ and excluded from
further analysis. Color discriminability procedures (see Stimulus Selection Procedure) determined
color discrimination capabilities for each participant, therefore deviation from the 50% color
discrimination threshold (near the point of subjective equality [~75%]) by more than -20% (55%
11

accuracy score) may indicate either lack of effort or failure of the preliminary color discrimination
task protocol.
Analyses of the behavioral data were performed using R (programming language) and
MATLAB (programming and numeric computing platform). Calculations for type-1 and type-2
Signal Detection Theory measures used the metaSDT Package (Maniscalco, Lau, 2014; R
implementation by Dr. Matt Craddock). Calculations for response-specific (RS)(see below)
measures were performed using the fit_rs_meta_d_MLE (MATLAB) function (Maniscalco & Lau,
2014; Maniscalco & Lau, 2014). Routines for graphical representations were developed. Graphical
representations include scatter plots with regression lines and boxplots.

Response-Specific Methodology
The goal of the present study is to investigate whether confidence reliably indexes
performance in a 2AFC task when near-threshold color features are presented, and in such cases
are either noticed or not noticed. To probe such a dissociation, response-specific calculations were
performed on the data to quantify differences between those instances where the signal was either
present or absent. In a 2-choice detection task, signal 1 (noise [here, color difference absent]) is
calculated independently of signal 2 (signal [color present]). Meta-d' quantifies the distance
between the signal and noise distributions in signal-to-noise ratio units, where the signal is
represented as those confidence responses congruent with a metacognitively optimal observer:
meta-d' = d' (Maniscalco, Lau, 2012).
Participant performance (type 1 data) for each condition was calculated using signal
detection theory (SDT) d' for monochromatic trials, threshold aware and unaware trials,
independently. Trials with differentially colored stimulus items were compared to trials where all
12

stimulus items are a single monochromatic color. Participant confidence (type 2 data) for each
condition was calculated using meta-d'.
To investigate the relationship between shape-decision accuracy and confidence (both
above and below-threshold), linear regression models were implemented. Models predicted the
relationship between those trials where participants reported that they were aware and trials where
participants reported they were unaware of a color difference for the monochromatic and threshold
conditions. Importantly, we are not interested in the linear relationship between how well a
participant is capable of noticing color differences and their performance on the shape task, but
instead, we are interested in the relationship between shape-task performance and confidence for
each condition: metacognitive sensitivity. Bias-free measures of d' were plotted against the SDTbased measure meta-d' for CC aware and CC unaware trials as well as MC trials.
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS
Study Execution
Participants whose mean performance increased in the CC condition were selected. 33 of
the 43 participants recruited for the study experienced performance increases in the CC condition
with the 24 item presentations.

Discrimination and Detection by Condition
Shape task
Objective performance measures were obtained for the shape discrimination task. Percent
correct (PC) and d' scores where calculated for both MC and CC conditions, where CC-aware and
CC-unaware were calculated individually (see Figure 2a). Linear regression analyses were
conducted between each: MC, CC-aware, and CC-unaware conditions for PC score. There was a
significant difference in accuracy (PC) between the MC and CC-unaware, r(64) = 0.077, F(1, 64) =
5.36, p < 0.05. Similarly, we found a significant difference in accuracy (PC) between the MC and
CC-aware r(64) =0.108, F(1, 64) = 7.71, p < 0.01. There was no significant difference in accuracy
between CC-aware and CC-unaware, r(64) = 3.960, F(1, 64) = 0.0002, p = 0.987.
Linear regression analyses were conducted between each: MC, CC-aware and CCunaware conditions for d' score. There was a significant difference in accuracy (d') between the
MC and CC-unaware, r(62) = 0.065, F(1, 62) = 4.34, p < 0.05. Similarly, we found a significant
difference in accuracy (d') between the MC and CC-aware r(63) =0.106, F(1, 63) = 7.49, p < 0.01.
There was no significant difference in accuracy between CC-aware and CC-unaware, r(63) = 003,
F(1, 63) = 0.187, p = 0.667. These results are consistent with the selection procedure: participants
who experienced performance increases in the shape task were selected to investigate whether
14

confidence and performance dissociate under these conditions.

Color task
Linear regression analyses for the color decision were conducted between MC and CC
condition for both PC and d' scores. We found a significant difference in accuracy (PC) between
the MC and CC condition, r(64) = 0.117, F(1, 64) = 8.48, p < 0.01. We found no significant
difference in accuracy (d') between the MC and CC-unaware r(64) = 0.045, F(1, 64) = 2.999, p =
0.0882.

Figure 2: Participant scores for both conditions. (A) &(B) Percent correct and d' scores for shape
task. Threshold condition was sub-divided into those trials where participants were and were not
aware of the color difference. (C) & (D) Percent correct and d’ scores for color detection, each
15

condition.
Discrimination and Detection by Confidence Level
Shape task
Confidence ratings were obtained for the shape discrimination task. Mean PC scores for
each confidence level for each condition were evaluated using a two-way ANOVA, with color
condition (mono, threshold aware, threshold unaware) x confidence rating (1-4) as the two withinsubject factors. A two-way ANOVA was performed to analyze the effect of color condition and
confidence ratings on performance. A two-way ANOVA revealed no significant interaction
between color condition and confidence ratings in the shape discrimination task, F(6, 370) = 0.586,
p = 0.741. Simple main effects analysis showed that color condition had a statistically significant
effect on accuracy (p < 0.01). Simple main effects analysis showed that confidence rating did have
a statistically significant effect on accuracy (p < 0.001). Increases in accuracy were predicted by
higher confidence scores when analyzed by percent correct scores which are affected by both
sensitivity and bias.

Color task
Similarly, confidence ratings were obtained for the color detection task. Mean PC scores
for each confidence level for each condition were evaluated using a two-way ANOVA, with color
condition (mono & threshold) x confidence rating (1-4) as the two within-subject factors. A twoway ANOVA was performed to analyze the effect of color condition and confidence ratings on
performance. A two-way ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between color condition and
confidence ratings in the color detection task, F(3, 252) = 1.661, p = 0.176. Simple main effects
analysis showed that color condition did have a statistically significant effect on accuracy (p <
16

0.001). Simple main effects analysis showed that confidence rating did not have a statistically
significant effect on accuracy (p = 0.975).

Figure 3: Participant scores for both conditions by confidence rating. (A) Percent correct for
shape task. Threshold condition was sub-divided into those trials where participants were and
were not aware of the color difference. (B) Percent correct for color detection, each condition.

Metacognitive Measures by Condition
Shape task
Three separate one-way ANOVAs (figure 4) with three levels (mono, aware, unaware)
were conducted to assess the relationship of color condition on meta-d', meta-difference (meta-d' d'), and meta-ratio (meta-d' / d') shape scores. A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the
effect of color condition on meta-d' score. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was not a
statistically significant difference in meta-d' score between the 3 groups (F(2, 94) = 1.493, p =
0.230).
A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the effect of color condition on metadifference score. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was a statistically significant difference
17

in meta-difference score between at least two groups (F(2, 94) = 3.813, p < 0.05). Tukey’s HSD
test for multiple comparisons found that the mean value of meta-difference score was significantly
different between MC and CC when participants were unaware (p < 0.05, 95% C.I. = [-0.61,
-0.04]). There was no statistically significant difference in mean meta-difference scores between
MC and CC aware (p = 0.249) or between CC unaware and CC aware (p = 0.476).
A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the effect of color condition on m-ratio
score. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was not a statistically significant difference in mratio score between the 3 groups (F(2, 94) = 1.244, p = 0.293).

Color task
Three separate paired t-tests (mono, threshold) were conducted to assess the relationship
of color choice meta-d', meta-difference (meta-d' - d'), and meta-ratio (meta-d' / d') scores. A paired
samples t-test was performed to compare meta-d' score between MC and CC conditions. There was
no significant difference in meta-d' score between MC (M = 0.394, SD = 0.504) and CC (M =
0.207, SD = 0.442); t(31) = 1.24, p = 0.225.
A paired samples t-test was performed to compare meta-difference score between MC
and CC conditions. There was a significant difference in meta-difference score between MC (M =
0.061, SD = 0.602) and CC (M = 0.283, SD = 0.507); t(31) = 2.05, p < 0.05.
A paired samples t-test was performed to compare m-ratio score between MC and CC
conditions. There was no significant difference in m-ratio score between MC (M = 0.554, SD =
3.259) and CC (M = -2.026, SD = 13.359); t(31) = 1.06, p = 0.297.

18

Figure 4: Participant metacognitive scores. (A) Meta-d' scores. (B) Meta-difference (meta-d' – d')
scores for shape task. (C) Meta-ratio (meta-d' / d') scores (D-F) Metacognitive measures for color
detection.
SDT Measures of Confidence and Performance
Shape
SDT Measures of Confidence and Performance were calculated for the shape
discrimination and color detection task. 3 separate regression analyses were performed for both
MC and CC conditions for the shape task, where CC-aware and CC-unaware were calculated
individually (see Figure 5). We quantified the difference between hits and false alarms as the ztransformed distance between them: d’. Meta-d’ quantifies deviations of confidence ratings from
those of a metacognitively ideal observer. Accounting for response bias, we modeled the
relationship between d’ and meta-d’ in order to quantify the sensitivity of each participant’s
19

metacognitive assessments of their decisions as a function of their d’ scores. For the
monochromatic condition, simple linear regression was used to test if d' score significantly
predicted meta-d' score. The fitted regression model was: Meta-d' score = 0.2272 + 0.4241*(d'
score). The overall regression was not statistically significant (R2 = 0.06, F(1, 30) = 1.77, p =
0.085). It was found that d' score did not significantly predict meta-d' score (β = 0.4241 , p =
0.194).
For the threshold condition where participants were aware of the color manipulation,
simple linear regression was used to test if d' score significantly predicted meta-d' score. The fitted
regression model was: Meta-d' score = 0.0.1134 + 0.5120*(d' score). The overall regression was
not statistically significant (R2 = 0.16, F(1, 31) = 5.86, p = 0.410). It was found that d' score
significantly predicted meta-d' score (β = 0.4974, p < 0.05).
For the threshold condition where participants were unaware of the color manipulation,
simple linear regression was used to test if d' score significantly predicted meta-d' score. The fitted
regression model was: Meta-d' score = 0.05982 + 0.29996*(d' score). The overall regression was
not statistically significant (R2 = 0.07, F(1, 30) = 2.20, p = 0.630). Consistent with the hypothesis, it
was found that d' score did not significantly predict meta-d' score (β = 0.3000, p = 0.138).

Color
We also modeled the relationship between d’ and meta-d’ for the color decision. 2
separate regression analyses were performed for the color detection task, where MC and CC were
calculated individually (see Figure 5). For the monochromatic condition, simple linear regression
was used to test if d' score significantly predicted meta-d' score. The fitted regression model was:
Meta-d' score = 0.39069 + 0.01085*(d' score). The overall regression was statistically significant
(R2 = 5.19, F(1, 31) = 0.002, p < 0.01). It was found that d' score did not significantly predict meta20

d' score (β = 0.0109, p = 0.968).
For the threshold condition, simple linear regression was used to test if d' score
significantly predicted meta-d' score. The fitted regression model was: Meta-d' score = 0.05982 +
0.29996*(d' score). The overall regression was not statistically significant (R2 = 0.07, F(1, 30) =
2.323, p = 0.630). It was found that d' score did not significantly predict meta-d' score (β =
0.29996, p = 0.138).

Figure 5: SDT measures of type-1 (d') and type-2 (meta-d') scores for (A) shape task and (B) color
task.
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION
This study investigated performance and confidence judgments in a 2AFC task when
either the majority or minority group of shapes were colored with different hue values than the
inverse group. The color manipulation procedure was implemented to increase performance in the
2AFC task. Trials with the color manipulation were compared with trials where no color difference
was present. The results of the initial experiment indicated that the task was too difficult for
participants. When the total number of stimulus items was reduced to 24, performance increases
were found where color differences were present in 33/43 subjects. For those participants whom
differentially colored stimuli increased performance, we investigated whether confidence covaried
with performance. Importantly, results were not confounded by selecting subjects for whom the
color manipulation increased performance, as the research question sought to investigate whether
under certain conditions performance may diverge from confidence. Under these conditions,
confidence did not significantly track with performance when participants were presented with
monochromatic stimuli. Similarly, confidence did not track with performance increases when
subjects were unaware of the presence of color. Interestingly, confidence did track with
performance when participants were aware of a color difference.
Shape decision meta-d’ scores in both the MC and CC-unaware conditions were not
significantly different, yet performance scores (both d’ and PC) were significantly increased in the
CC-unaware condition when compared with the MC condition. When taken together, this supports
that confidence was not indexing the experienced performance increases between the MC and CCunaware conditions.

Shape Decision
As required by the parameters of the current study, shape choice was helped by
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differentially colored stimulus items in either group (majority or minority). A mechanism by which
color effect may benefit performance is yet to be determined. Perceptual grouping, and/or a
heuristic could make the task more simple for participants than when no such manipulation is
present. The goal of implementing the color manipulation was to increase performance in the
threshold condition; irrespective of whether participants were or were not aware of the color
manipulation.
With fewer total stimulus items (n=24) in a given trial, the experiment showed increased
performance in the threshold condition when those items, with either 100% of the majority shapes
or 100% of the minority shapes, were colored differently in a given trial. Pilot experiments
suggested that chance performance was observed when stimulus items with 50% of the majority
shapes and 100% of the minority shapes were colored differently in a given trial. In this setup, a
conflation of the most salient color may have drawn attention to a portion of the shapes with nearequivalent amounts of positive evidence. We concluded that the unknown mechanism of action
may warrant investigation in future studies. Although the effect was not used in the present study,
we speculate that further discrepancies in performance may be observed with the implementation
of these color manipulations when the intent is to bias performance without conscious awareness of
that which helped one’s performance.

Color Detection
Color detection performance was approximated using an ad hoc procedure intended to
render about half of the threshold condition trials unaware. The number of trials with the color
manipulation present was double that of the monochromatic trials. Splitting the threshold data in
this way inadvertently resulted in unequal sample sizes of the dependent and independent variables.
Weighted means controlled for these differences, yet results were complicated by the
23

multidimensional design which included the second factor: shape choice (see Limitations).

Limitations
The present study recruited 43 subjects, 33 of which demonstrated the intended effect.
Because in-person data collection was limited due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a web-based study
was performed. Observation of the participants was not possible. Employing more stringent
participant monitoring may increase the quantity and quality of relevant participant data. Future
studies using an online platform will employ webcam-based eye-tracking to better ensure
participant engagement.
For some participants, shape accuracy was near-chance for certain conditions. In some
instances, this caused slight variations between type-1 and type-2 data (specifically, m-ratio and
meta-difference scores) to appear more extreme than reality. M-ratio (meta-d' / d') yielded extreme
differences which complicated a meaningful comparison between color conditions. I.e. a type-2
score of 0.05 (divisor) with a type-1 score of 0.06 (dividend) will result in an M-ratio of 0.83.
Whereas, a type-2 score of 0.05 and a type-1 score of 0.10 (a small difference) will result in a much
lower ratio of 0.50, suggesting a more extreme relationship than reality, as there is only a 0.04
difference between the two M-ratios. Therefore, the interpretability of m-ratio as a measure that
quantifies the relationship of metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d') and primary task performance (d')
is limited.

Conclusion
Using task-irrelevant, below threshold interventions to directly manipulate performance
has the potential benefit of creating dissociations between one’s performance and the
metacognitive assessment of their performance. It is yet unknown whether a similar procedure may
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be employed for other perceptual phenomena. Color awareness may be fundamentally distinct from
other properties. The present study employed a secondary manipulation which made the task easier.
With near, or below-threshold changes to the stimulus, we were able to produce increases in
performance without corresponding changes in confidence. As such, confidence appears to be a
robust measure that generally indexes our performance. Yet, under certain circumstances,
confidence may not index changes in accuracy. Caution should be taken when forced-choice
decisions may be susceptible to secondary near-threshold manipulations. Future studies will
include stimulus manipulations that lay entirely below the point of subjective equality to further
investigate whether confidence is able to index changes in performance when subjects are unaware
of that which is influencing their decisions.
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